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The imposition of water quality controls has been both criticized and praised for its 
distributional impacts in the popular literature. Few, if any, empirical measures of the 
distributional impact have been attempted. This research had two objectives: first, to 
analyze methodologies of measuring income distribution changes, and, second, to select 
appropriate methodology and empirically test for the impacts of water quality controls. 
The lognormal, displaced lognormal, gamma, and beta distribution functions were 
considered as appropriate methodologies, since each allows a more unique measurement 
of income distribution than do the Gini, Pietra, and Theil Entropy indices. Income 
distribution data were collected from all Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas in the 
United States, and parameters of each of the functions were estimated. The Gastwirth 
upper and lower bound test for Gini coefficients was applied as a "goodness of fit" 
measure and the beta function was clearly superior to the other forms. 
Next, a simultaneous equation econometric model was constructed, using a 
factor-share approach for wage and price changes. Water quality controls were introduced 
in the model through effects on wages and mean family income, and the latter variables 
were included in equations estimating the two parameters of the beta distribution 
function. Water quality data were collected for all states, and indices of quality were 
estimated using analysis of variance techniques. These indices did not differ significantly 
between states, but did differ between the census. years 1960 and 1970, so a first 
difference model was constructed. Since this model theoretically conformed with the 
derivatives of the initial conceptual model, no conceptual problem was encountered. 
Regressions were run for a total of 172 SMSA's, adjusted so that new SMSA's or 
combined SMSA's from the 1960 data in the 1970 data were deleted from the study. 
Regression results were inconclusive. When water quality variables were significant 
in the price equation, the coefficients for industrial controls were positive while those of 
agricultural controls were negative. For the wage equation the coefficients had the 
opposite signs. The quality variable was not consistently significant in the wage equations; 
however, both price and wage variables were significant in most of the equations 
estimating the beta distribution parameters. Price variables appeared to have the effect of 
making income distribution more equal, while wage variables had the opposite effect. 
In an attempt to account for the many variables which might be expected to effect 
income distribution, factor analysis was performed on the SMSA's. Two groups of 
SMSA's were identified, and the regressions were performed for these groups. Results 
were quite similar to the original regressions. 
Any interpretation of the results with respect to water quality programs or policy 
prescriptions based on those interpretations, would be dubious. The data limitations and 
the problems with possible model misspecification, with respect to variables which may 
have drastically changed over all SMSA's, make the results suspect. Factor analysis, while 
it may eliminate some of the relevant data problems, does not account for the policy 
changes, such as the Vietnamese War or the tax and transfer payment changes. Clearly, 
the causality between water quality controls and income distribution has not been 
determined by this research. As a minimum, refinement of data for the cost of 
compliance and/or treatment costs is necessary. Further exploration of the appropriate 
models and expansion of the data base should, however, lead to fruitful results. 
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AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF PREDICTORS OF INCOME DISTRIBUTION 
EFFECTS OF WATER QUALITY CONTROLS 
Introduction 
The imposition of constraints on economic 
activity have two possible effects: changing resource 
allocations among production possibilities and chang-
ing the distribution of the benefits of production 
among members of society. 1 An overwhelming 
majority of recent economic analysis deals with the 
former question. Many of the standard economic 
tools are structured to analyze allocation effects. The 
study of distributional changes also has a rather long 
history, but only recently have tools with strong 
analytic capability been suggested in the literature. 
Tests of these tools using current policies provide two 
benefits: (1) the tools themselves can be examined 
for usefulness and effectiveness, and (2) the effects of 
policies can be analyzed. The following is a research 
report on such tests involving water quality controls. 
The Problem 
The research problem consisted of two separate 
areas: (l) the income distribution measures and 
suggested alternatives, and (2) the impact of water 
quality controls on income distribution. The first 
necessarily had to be explored before the policy 
questions could be addressed. 
The Distribution Measures 
The income distribution measures most often 
utilized in the analysis of policy effects have been the 
Gini, Pietra, or Theil Entropy coefficients. These 
measures relate the actual income distribution to an 
equal distribution of income by measuring, in various 
ways, the area between the two distributions. The 
actual income distribution is represented by a Lorenz 
curve, which relates percent of income received to 
percent of population. A shortcoming of the Gini, 
Pietra, and Theil index is that a given "area of 
inequality" may be circumscribed by an infinite 
number of Lorenz curves, so that one distribution 
'1 There is also a question concerning the division of 
returns among factors of production, but this appears to be a 
more allocational than distributional kind of analysis. 
1 
may be "more equal" than another, in the sense that 
income is distributed more widely over the popUla-
tion, but have the same Gini, Pietra, or Theil indices 
(see for example Budd (1967), and Budd and Seiders 
(1971)). 
Several authors have suggested alternative 
measuring methods based on probability density 
functions which have parameters which relate to both 
the mean and skewness of a density function 
(Champernowne, 1974). Metcalf (1972) utilized 
lognormal and displaced lognormal distributions to 
estimate the Lorenz curve. The latter function has the 
property that the distribution is not necessarily 
symmetric about the mean, which would be expected 
of a Lorenz curve. Two of the Pearson family of 
curves have also been suggested: the gamma density 
function and the beta density function (Metcalf, 
1972, and Thurow, 1972). All these functions have 
two parameters which relate mean, variances, and 
skewness (that is, have estimation of the first, second, 
and third moments), allowing a more complete 
description of the Lorenz curve. 
The lognonnal density 
The distribution of family income may be ap-
proximated by two parameter lognormal distribution 
function, or a three parameter displaced lognormal 
distribution function. Various measures of distribu-
tional equality from the two functions are obtainable. 
The curve fitting procedures include the 
computation of mean income in each of the income 
groups. The midpoint is chosen as the mean income 
for the first income group; the mean income of the 
open ended interval is obtained by fitting a Pareto 
curve to the data. 
Pareto's mathematical formulation is widely 
used as the basis for estimating the mean for the 
open-end of an income distribution. For a discussion 
of fitting a Pareto curve to the open-end interval see 
U.S. Bureau of the Census (1965). Due to assumed 
geometric nature of the income distribution, the 
mean income of each of the remainder of the groups 
is computed from the geometric mean of the lower 
and upper bounds. 
The overall mean income of the population is 
estimated by: 
in which fli is the group mean income and fi is the 
number of families in group i. 
Income distribution appears to be positively 
skewed in that fl is greater than the median (see 
Figure 1). Thus, it is likely that income is more 
closely approximated by a lognormal curve than a 
normal curve. 
The density function of the three parameter 
lognormal 2 is 
f([X+C], M, V) = EXPJln(X+C}M] 
(X+C)VY'2IT l 2V 
in which 0 <x<oo,/3>O,C>-y>_oo. 
The variable x is defined as the income and f(x) is the 
percentage of families having that income. The 
method of moments was used to estimate the two 
parameters, M and V, of the lognormal density 
function, and the method of quartiles was used to 
estimate the three parameters, M, V, and C, of the 
displaced lognormal density function. 
The parameter M, which is the natural log of 
the geometric mean of x, should also equal the 
natural log of the median, if the actual distribution is 
the two parameter lognormal. Since the income 
distribution in the SMSA's is skewed, often 
dramatically, the three parameter lognormal may be a 
more desirable estimation. The third parameter of the 
lognormal may be a more desirable estimation. The 






Figure 1. One type ofincome curve. 
income 
2 
indicate the extent to which the income must be 
shifted to "best" fit the lognormal distribution 
function. 2 
The gamma density 
The gamma density is one of the functional 
forms suggested to describe changes in the distribu-
tion of income. Salem and Mount (1974) found that 
the two gamma parameters can be directly related to 
indicators of inequality and scale, and the two 
parameters are easy to estimate. 
If income per family is represented by x, then 
the family income is distributed as the gamma density 
O<x<oo f(x,a,/3) = xGr l e-{ix 
rea) in which 
a and /3 are positive parameters, and 
rea) = S~ e-Y yawl dy 
o 
is the gamma function. It is assumed that all the 
family incomes are multiplied by a constant k, 
namely Y = kx, as would happen under Gibrat's Law 
of proportionate growth. The density function of Y is 





G(Y) and g(Y) can be related to F(x) and f(x) 
in the following equations 
G(Y) = pry ~y} 
== p{kx~y} 
= p{x ~ (Y/k)} 
= f y/k f(x) dx 
o 
F(y/k) - F(o) 
F(y/k) 
g(Y) = dt G(Y) 
d 
== dY F(y/k) 
(assume k> 0) 
== f(y/k) (dx/dY) 
2 The two parameter lognormal is simply a special case 
of the three parameter, wherein the skewness, or third param-





)a-l e -/3. L 
k r(a) k 
(jJ/k)a a-I -(/3M 
rea) y e y 
f(y;a, f) 
It is clear that a is not directly related to the 
scale change in income, but is related to the skewness, 
kertosis, and variance. 
It has been shown that Gini (Salem and Mount, 
1974), Theil, and Pietra (McDonald and Jensen, 
1976) indices are all functions of a alone. Thus, the 
non-uniqueness of these inequality measuIes is clear. 
McDonald and Jensen also indicate that maximum 
likelihood estimators have smaller sample biases than 
method of moments estimations in most cases. 
The beta density 
The final distribution form to be examined is 
the beta density function. The beta function has the 
form 
f( ) - r(u+p) XU- I (I_X\O-l X,U,p - r(u).r(p) r 
The relationship between the beta function and 
the three indices of inequality is currently under 
study. No specific relationship has been determined, 
nor has it been demonstrated that the maximum 
likelihood estimators ba\{e smaller sample biases than 
the method of moments. Since the maximum likeli-
hood estimators are impossible to directly estimate at 
present, a Newton-Raphson' approximation is used. 
However, since the beta and gamma functions are 
members of the same Pearson family of distributions, 
the use of maximum likelihood estimators appears 
warranted. 
The empirical estimation of 
income distribution 
The major problems of estimating the income 
distribution parameters for each of the chosen func-
tions were:. first, to choose the method of estimating 
the mean of the highest (unbounded) income class, 
and second, to estimate the parameters of each 
function corresponding to the income distribution 
data collected from the 1960 and 1970 census data 
for every Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area 
(SMSA) in the nation. 
As discussed, the Pareto-Levy law was used by 
the US. Bureau of the Census (1965) to estimate the 
3 
mean of the unbounded upper income group. This 
law states: 
.•. The upper ranges of the income distribution 
could be described by a eurve of the general 
type Y AX·V; where X is the income size and 
Y is the number of persons have that, or a 
larger, income. 
The "weak" form of the Pareto-Levy law is used in 
this study. This weak law states that percentage of 
individuals with an income level U exceeded some 
number Uo approximates (U/Uo)-(t as U approaches 
infinity. While the law is difficult to use for lower 
income levels, it is a reasonable approximation of the 
higher income group. Because the only income group 
requiring estimation is the "open-intervalled" highest 
income group, the law probably applies reasonably 
well. 
A related difficulty occurs when the beta 
function is used for income distribution estimation. 
Since the beta function is a finite distribution 
function of scaled incomes (that is, scaled between 0 
and 1), it has a maximum income implicit in its 
estimation, The mean income of the open ended, 
interval derived from the Pareto-Levy law is the. 





UD B + 2(X-b) 
maximum income; 
upper limit of the interval preced-
ing the open ended interval; and 
mean income of the open ended 
intervaL 
Incomes were divided by UD to satisfy the scale 
(0 to 1). 
Distribution data were collected from the 1960 
and 1970 census of population (U.S. Bureau of 
Census, 1963, 1973, 1974, 1975) and from data 
available in the 1972 County and City Data Book 
(1972). Since only grouped data of the family income 
of SMSA's are available, it was assumed that every 
member of the particular income group receives the 
same income, measured by the midpoint of that 
group. Thirteen income groups were used for 1960 
and 1970 data to make comparisons possible. The 
1960 data were restructured from original data tapes 
in order to make the groupings compatible with 1970 
data. 
Computer programs were developed to estimate 
the parameters of the displaced lognormal, gamma, 
and beta density functions from these data. The 
programs can be found in Appendices 1 and 2. The 
estimations of these parameters are given in Tables 1 
and 2 for each SMSA. 
.j:o. 
Table 1. 1960 income parameters for each distribution function and Gastwirth bounds. 








Ann Arbor, Mich 
Ashville, NC 
Atlanta, Ga 
Atlantic City, NJ 
Austin, Tex 
,Bakersfield, Cal 
Ba1 timore, Md 
Baton Rouge, La 
Bay City, Mich 




















































































































































































Lognormal Displaced Lognormal 

















































































































































































Table 1. Continued. 
S.M.S.A. (60) 
Canton, Ohio 
Cedar Rapids, Iowa 
Champaign, III 
Charlotte, SC 




Colo Springs, Colo 
Columbia, SC 
Columbus, Ohio 




































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 1. Continued. 
S.M.S.A. (60) 
Fi tchburg, Mass 
Ft Lauderdale, Fla 
Ft Wayne, Ind 
Ft Worth Tex 
Fresno, Cal 
Gary, Ind 
Grand Rapids, Mich 
Great Falls, Mont 












Jersey City, NJ 
Kalamazoo, Mich 


























































































































































































Lognormal Displaced Lognormal 




































































































































































































Table 1. Continued. 
S.M.S.A. (60) 
Lake Charles, La 
Lancaster, Pa 






Little Rock, Ark 
Loraine, Ohio 

























































































































































































































































































































































































































New Bedford, Mass 
New Britain, Conn 
New Haven, Conn 
New Orleans, La 
New York, NY 
Newark, NJ 







































































































































































































Lognormal Displaced Lognormal 






































0.43 8171. 30 
0.44 11699.62 
0.39 2095.24 
0.40 3961. 90 
0.41 2796.35 















































































































































St. Joseph, MO 
St.Louis, III 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
San Anj el0, Tex. 
San Antonio, Tex 
San Bernadino, Cal 
San Diego, Cal 
San Francisco, Cal 
San Jose, Cal 






Sioux Falls, SD 



















































































































1. 88 10.89 



























































Lognormal Displaced Lognormal 


























0.44 13443.85 9.96 
0.39 5050.57 9.42 
0.39 5126.68 9.38 
0.39 3848.60 9.30 
0.40 9580.66 9.67 
0.41 7578.46 9.47 
0.43 4635.49 9.30 
0.39 1827.64 9.00 
0.45 18457.28 10.08 
0.45 11712.40 9.75 
0.41 3996.08 9.20 
0.43 4966.45 9.35 
0.42 4779.83 9.38 
0.40 5037.88 9.43 
0.42 3388.60 9.23 
0.45 122743.50 11.76 
0.41 5273.94 9.23 
0.39 7254.95 9.58 
0.48 40041.95 10.74 
0.43 6611.72 9.42 
0.40 5648.23 9.34 
0.38 6387.18 9.49 
0.40 4009.27 9.22 
0.43 6556.65 9.34 



































































































































































































































































































Lognormal Displaced Lognormal 







































































































































































Ann Arbor, Mich 
Ashville, NC 
Atlanta, Ga 




Baton Rouge, La 
Bay City, Mich 
Beaumont, Tex 
Billings, Mont 





























































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2. Continued. 
S.M.S.A. (70) 
Canton, Ohio 
Cedar Rapids, Iowa 
Champaign, III 
Charlotte, SC 




Colo Springs, Colo 
Columbia, SC 
Columbus, Ohio 






Des Moines, Iowa 
Detroi t, Mich 
Dubuque, Iowa 
Duluth, Minn 


























































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2. Continued. 
S.M.S.A. (70) 
Fitchburg, Mass 
Ft Lauderdale, Fla 
Ft Wayne, Ind 
Ft Worth, Tex 
Fresno, Cal 
Gary, Ind 
Grand Rapids, Mich 
Great Falls, Mont 












Jersey City, NJ 
Kalamazoo, Mich 










































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2. Continued. 
S.M.S.A. (70) 
Lake Charles, La 
Lancaster, Pa 






Little Rock, Ark 
Loraine, Ohio 





















































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2. Continued. 
S .M.S .A. (70) 
Nuskegon, Nich 
Nashville, Tenn 
New Bedford, Mass 
New Britain, Conn 
New Haven, Conn 
New Orleans, La 
New York, NY 
Newark, NJ 






























































































































































































































































































































































































































St Joseph, Mo 
St Louis, Mo 
Salt Lake City, Ut 
San Angelo, Iex 
San Antonio, Tex 
San Bernadino, Cal 
San Diego, Cal 
San Francisco, Cal 
San Jose, Cal 





Sioux City, Iowa 
Sioux Falls, SD 





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Lognonnal Displaced Lognormal 
















































































































































































One of the objectives of the research was to 
evaluate the different methodologies. The Gastwirth 
indices were used as the test. Gastwirth (1971, 1972, 
1974) suggested a method of estimation of the Gini 
coefficient with group data that do not require any 
assumption about the functional form of income 
distribution. The method yields upper and lower 
bounds for the Gini coefficient. A "goodness of fit" 
test can be performed by relating the Gini coefficient 
generated by each of the estimation techniques to the 
Gastwirth bounds. This test is not a statistical test; 
rather it provides an alternative estimation of the 
upper and lower bounds of the Gini. The Gastwirth 
bounds are also indicated in Tables 1 and 2 for each 
SMSA. 
Gastwirth (1975) found that the lognormal and 
displaced lognormal functions fail the test consistent-
I y . Metcalf (1972) indicates that logrithrnic 
transformation over estimates the positive skewness 
of the data. The Gini coefficients generated by the 
lognormal and displaced lognormal functions fell 
outside the Gastwirth bounds in every SMSA, as can 
be seen in Tables 1 and 2. The gamma distribution 
function also consistently failed the Gastwirth test 
for each SMSA. The beta functions produced a Gini 
coefficient which frequently fell between the upper 
and lower Gastwirth bounds. When the beta-produced 
Gini is outside the bounds, the coefficient was 
substantially closer to one or the other of the bounds 
than any of the other functional forms. The Gast-
wirth test indicated that, for the purpose of this 
study, the beta was the appropriate estimation 
function. 
Analysis of Water Quality 
Control Effects 
Once the beta function was selected as the 
appropriate form for the test, an analysis of the 
effects of water quality controls was devised. This 
analysis consisted of three steps: first, an econometric 
model was conceptualized in order to generate test 
table hypotheses with respect to income distribution 
changes. Second, the data were accumulated for both 
water quality controls and for the other variables in 
the modeL Finally, the hypotheses were tested for 
significance. 
The conceptual basis 
The conceptual model used in this study was 
drawn from models developed by Pitchford (1957, 
1963), and a recent extension by Pitchford and 
Turnsovsky (1975) which examined the effect of 
inflation on tax incidence and income distribution. 
These' models utilize a factor-share approach to 
distribution, in that labor and entrepreneurs are each 
assumed to attempt to avoid tax payments by passing 
18 
these payments on through either higher wages or 
prices, respectively. This is, of course, not a profit 
maximizing model, but is rather a model of short-run 
wage and price adjustments. There is a similarity 
between the increasing costs due to taxes and those 
due to water quality controls based on effluent 
limitations, especially for entrepreneurs. Since these 
costs may have some effect on output.. and the wage 
bill, the workers also may attempt to pas~ on 
treatment costs in the form of higher wages. The 
model assumes that wages and prices are determined 
partly by competitive demand and partly by the 
non-competitive environmental costs. The proportion 
of treatment costs which each will attempt to pass is 
defined as Xn and Xw, where Xn is the en trepreneurial 
proportion and Xw is the labor proportion. Xn + Xw 
must equal 1 and both proportions are greater than or 
equal to zero. 
The price and wage adjustment equations can 





= Kl (QQ;t) +K2 (Pt~P) ... (1) 
K3 (N~tNt) + K4 (W~ W) . . (2) 
in which 
P price 
!:.p::: change in price 
nt target profit set by producers 
Q output 
Qt target output set by producers 
W ::: wage 
!:. W change in wage 
wt target wage set by workers 
N employment 
Nt = target employment set by workers 
KJ , K2 , K3 , and K4 are non-negative coefficients. 
Note that target employment and output are directly 
controllable by entrepreneurs and laborers, respective-
ly, while prices and wages are not. 
Following the Pitchford and Turnovsky deri-
vation, target wage (wt) and target profit (nt) are 
defined as: 
and 
nt ::: i3W+ XnWq ...... (4) 
a and i3 are parameters and W stands for the treat-
ment cost per unit of output. Thus, the entrepreneurs 
attempt to maintain a profit level proportional to 
wages and treatment costs, while laborers attempt to 
maintain a wage level proportional to prices and treat-
ment cost which might be passed to them from pro-
ducers in the form of lower wages. The target price 
then is: 
pI = Wt + TIt 
aP + {3W + (Xw + Xn) W q 
aP + (3W + Wq . . . (5) 
It is further assumed that the factor share to labor, b 
is defined as 
b WN PQ 
and we can select units of measuremen t such that 
(6) 
(7) 
In order to examine the possible effects of water 
quality controls on income distribution, the following 
mathematical manipulations are made. 
o = kl (Q~tQI) + k2 ~a'l) + {3 ~ + ;] 
. . . . .. . (8) 
o k3 (N. Ntl + k4 [aR...+ Xw Wq IJ 
Nt I W W 
. . . . . . . {'7) 
Assuming that B is constant, Equation 6 can be 
rearranged as 
~t = ~ ~. k2 (a.l+p W + ;q)] 
. (10) 
Substituting Equation 10 into Equation 9 and solving, 
o = k3 Pb fl.~ fa .l + (3 W + Wq)~ 
W l kl \ P P ~ 
. k3 + k4 [a ~ + W - ~ 
After algebraic manipulation, the stationary real wage 
can be identified as 
P ________ _ 
W - k2 k3 b + kl k3 + kl k4 
- k2 k3 b (a -1 + : qj + kl k4 a 
+ kl k4 X\~WqJ . . . . . . . . (11) 
The impact of increased real water treatment 
costs on the real wage is determined by the derivative 
of Equation 10 with respect to Wq/P: 
PI 
a(W'1 
(w \ = k2k3b{3 + kl k3 + kl k4 . a --.9..! P J 
-k2ks b] ......... (12) 
19 
Since all the coefficients k, {3, and b are assumed 
to be smaller than infini ty, (a{W IP»)/ (a (W q IP) is zero 
if and only if 
klk4XW - k2ks b = 0 
or 
Since b represents the wage bill proportion of 
output and Xw the amount of treatment cost which 
labor can pass on (assumably to entrepreneurs in the 
bargaining process), then real wage changes as a result 
of water quality controls only if labor is not able to 




It can further be assumed that: 
n p. W 
n W P = l.p 
a (TIl PI 
a (~) = 
. . . . (13) 
1 < O. . . . . . . (14) 
The higher the real wage, the lower the real profit will 
be. Thus, if 
a (W/P) > 0 
a{Wq/P) , 
then income will be redistributed from entrepreneur 
to labor; if 
a (W/P) < 0 then 
o{Wq/P) , 
income distribution changes will be in the opposite 
direction. If one assumes, as is probable, the entrepre-
neurs are in general in the higher income levels and 
wage earners are in general in the lower, then the shift 
in the Lorenz curve depends upon the relative changes 
in real wages and profits. Conceptually, water quality 
controls can have positive or negative distributional 
impacts; the argument is an empirical one. 
In order to test the effects of these controls on 
distribution, two empirical models were constructed. 
The first model is based upon the mathematical 
models used for the conceptual model; the second is a 
modification of the first which intuitively appears 
relevant. Given the same assumptions and equations 
as before (Equations 1 through 6), we can derive an 
empirical model as follows: 
Substituting Equation 5 into Equation 1 yields: 
pt _ P = (a· 1) P + {3W + Wq . . . . (15) 
Substituting Equation 3 into Equation 2 yields: 
Wt - W ap - W + XwWq . . . . . (16) 
Solving Equation 2 for N/Nt yields: 
Nt == ~ [L\: + ks -~ ( W\v W)] 
· . . . . . . . (17) 
Substituting Equation 16 into Equation 17 
~fl W ( P - W + Xw W q)~ - + k - k W 3 4 \ W N == 
or 
[L\W + k3 W - k4 (ap - W + Kw Wq)] 
· . . . . . . . (I8) 
From Equation 1: 
(PQ \ t 
L\P = kl \Qt'Pj +k2 (P -P) 
Substituting Equations 15 in to Equation 1, 
L\P kj(~?-P) +Is [(a-I)P+j3W+Wq ] 
or 
= kj(:~-P) +k2 [(a-I)P+{3W+Wq] 
· . . . . . . . (19) 
Substituting Equation 18 into Equation 19; and 
solving: 
L\P 
- bkaP] + kz [ 
kl kl k3 + kl k4 kl k4 a 
L\W + bk W P 
3 
The empirical model, then, is 
L\P == f (flW, W, P, Wq, b). 





L\P = kl (~~ - p) + kz (Pt P). 
Solving for PQ/Qt: 
P~ = + [L\P+kjP-kz(Pt. P)]. Q j 
Multiplying by b gives: 
bPQ = ~ [L\P+k jP-kz (a-l)P+/3W+Wq)] Qt 1 
. . . . . . . . (22) 
or 
From Equation 2: 
L\W = k3 (~ -Wi +k4 (wt-W) .... (24) 
N / 
Substituting Equation 18 into Equation 24: 
(
bPQ \ L\ W = k3 -t . W I + kdaP . W + Xw W q) Q I 
. (25) 
Substituting Equation 23 into Equation 25: 
tl W = k3 [~ {L\P + (k 1 Is a + kJ P 
+ (k2 /3' k1 ) W + k2 Wq } + k4 (aP- W+Kw W~ 
or k b 
3 
flW == k (k1 -Is a+kz +k1 ~ a)P 
1 
kab 




The empirical model, then, is 
L\W = g(L\P, P, W, Wq , b) 
. . . . (26) 
Note that b is a "shifter" for each of the equations, 
and is treated in the empirical model as such. 
The fmal two equations of the empirical model 
relate the income distribution parameters to the wage 
and price changes. Since other factors may also have 
impacts on this distribution, a constant term is 
included in each equation. Further, since the two 
parameters are functionally related in the beta 
distribution, each parameter is included in the equa-
tion for the other. Thus: 
LlO = G(LlP,LlW,Llp,C1),and 
LlP 
The empirical model 
(26) 
(27) 
Several empirical problems were encountered in 
the research effort. Data for important variables were 
missing so that surrogate variables consistent with the 
available data had to be selected for the model. The 
water quality data had a broad range of variables, so 
that indices had to be developed for each state. In 
addition, no cost data could be obtained to relate the 
water quality parameters to the wage and price 
equations. Therefore, the causality of the relation-
ships which used the physical parameters is direct if 
and only if the cost of treatment is monotonically 
related to the level of quality constraint. Therefore, 
any statistical significance must be taken as a 
historical trend, rather than a causal relationship, 
unless the monotonic relationships are assumed. 
Structural Equations 
Structural equations were developed from the 
conceptual model and from the relationships between 
appropriate variables and the distribution parameters. 
Since agricultural wage and price data were not 
available for, nor particularly relevant to, SMSA's, 
oilly manufacturing sectors were analyzed. The vari-
ables for each SMSA are: 
DB: Difference of the ratio of manufacturing pay-
roll t.o total family income, 1960 and 1970. 
This variable is a proxy for the labor wages-
output ratio for the manufacturing sector. The 
true ratio is probably underestimated, but the 
variable should be consistent between the two 
census years. Note that the change is used, 
rather than the absolute level, since wages and 
prices will change with changes in b. 
WI: Index of water quality controls in industrial 
sector. 
WA: Index of water quality controls in agricultural 
sectors. 
DG: Rate of change of the first parameter «(J) of the 
beta function. 
DH: Rate of change of the second parameter (p ) of 
the beta function. 
W: Industrial wage rate, 1960. 
DW: Change in wages in the manufacturing sector 
1960 to 1970. 
P: Mean family income in 1960. 
DP: Change in mean family income 1960 to 1970. 
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The first structural equations are: 
DP = 1> (DW, WI, WA, P, W, DB) 
DW := n (DP, WI, P, W, DB) 
DG L (DP, DW, DH, C1 ) 





WI, WA, DB, P, Ware exogenous variables; DP, DW, 
DG, and DH are the endogenous variables. 
The use of mean family income in Equations 28 
and 29 results from a data problem; price indices are 
not available except for a few selected cities. Further, 
no close proxies for price exist. The best proxies for 
price are personal income measures, such as mean 
family income. However, using the change mean 
family income as a proxy for changes in prices 
requires the assumption that output, employment, 
and employees per household maintain a constant 
relationship between observations. The seriousness of 
the violation of this assumption is open to debate. 
The model is assumed to be linear, so that th~ 
equation system is: 
DP = a1DW +a3 WI +a4 WA+asP+a6 W 
+a 7DB+e I 
DW = b2 DP +b3 Wr +bsP+b6 W+b 7 DB 
DG = gl DW + g2 DP + gsDH + kl 
DH = hI DW + l~ DP + Ilg DG + k2 
in which ai bi Cj, cit stand for the parameters in the 
four equations; ei stands for the disturbance term for 
four equations. 
The empirical model uses water quality para-
meters in both industry and agriculture in the "price" 
equation, because the price index should be a 
function of water quality costs to all productive 
activities. On the other hand, industrial wages are 
logically a direct function only of water quality costs 
in the industrial sector. 
A second empirical model was developed which 
included some variables thought to be important to 
income distribution changes but which were excluded 
from the conceptual modeL Some of the original 
variables were retained, and some were not, on an 
intuitive basis only. This model was constructed as: 
DP (DW, WI, W A, DY) . . (32) 
in which DY is the change in total family income 
between 1960 and 1970. This variable was a proxy 
for the rate of change of output in the economy of 
each SMSA. It was felt that total output would have 
an effect on prices in the economy. Price, wage, and 
factor share variables for 1960 were dropped from 
the equation. 
DW = W(DE, DP, DB, WI) . . . . . (33) 
in which DE is the change in unemployment rate 
change from 1960 to 1970 for each SMSA. The effect 
of unemployment on the wage rate was thought to be 
an important factor in wage determination. Wage and 
price variables for 1960 were again dropped, but the 
labor wage-output ratio was retained. Since both 
wage changes and output were included in Equation 
32, the variable for b was thought to be redundant. 
The equations for the distribution parameters re-
mained the same as in the first empirical model. 
This model was also assumed linear, so that the 
equation system was: 
DP 
DW b2 DP + b3 WI + b6 DE + b7 DB + e2 
DG and DH are the same. 
For the model WI, WA, DY, DE, and DB were 
exogenous variables, and DP, DW, DG, and DH were 
endogenous variables. 
The Water Quality Indices 
Water quality controls exist for five different 
classifications of uses: agricultural, industrial, recrea-
tional, fishery, and municipal. Each classification has 
specific controls or levels for 14 different criteria. 3 
These classifications can be treated as a series of 
treatments in an analysis of variance, for which the 
experimental design is written mathematically as: 
3These criteria include: dissolved oxygen, fecal coli-
form bacteria, total coliform bacteria, upper bound of 
temperature, changes in temperature, lower bound of pH, 
upper 'bound of pH, state standards for disinfection, mercury 
and heavy metals, state standards for mixing zones, nitrates, 
phosphates, secondary treatment definition, turbidity. 
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in which 
is the classification (i = 1, ... ,5) 
is the criteria 0 = 1, ... ,14) 
is the jth criteria for the ith classification 
population mean 
= the adjustment for water quality 
for the ith classification 
eij =: disturbance term 
The entire model in matrix form can be written: 
Yl! 000 0 
Y 
1,14 o 
Y21 o ~1 
Y2 14 , o 
Y31 o 
= + 
Y3 14 , o 
Y41 o 
Y4 ,14 o 
YS1 o 
000 0 
(70 X 1) (70 X 6) (6 XI) (70 X 1) 
The first equation, Yll == fJ. + al + ell can be 
interpreted as the temperature 0=1) of agricultural 
water (i=I), where the temperature cannot exceed fJ.l, 
the mean water temperature, plus a1, the adjustment 
for agricultural water quality control levels, and an 
observable disturbance term. Yll is not an absolute 
term; rather, it is the ratio of the criterion divided by 
its mean among 50 states. The model is linear, and all 
Xij equal one or zero. 
Clearly, the rank of each matrix is 
R(X) == 6, and R(X'X) < 6. 
Hence (XIX) is a singular matrix. Regression analysis 
cannot be performed to estimate parameters. It is 
assumed that: 
fJ.l = fJ. + a l 
Ils Il + as 
The 6 parameters can be reduced to 5 by this linear 
combination. {3 can then be estimated since R(X) 5. 
The following useful relations can be derived: 
Y == Xp +e 
E(Y) == E(X{3 + e) == Xp + E(e) == X{3 
Thus, Y is a linear unbiased estimate of X{3' in which 
Y == Xp' 
X'X{3 is also an estimable function. The linear 
unbiased estimate of X'X{3 is X'Y. 
X'y 
Furthermore, 













4: Z; Y. 
1 j I) 
Z; Y. j 1) 
~ Y. J 1) 
Z; Y. j I) 
Z; Y. j IJ 
Y .. 
Z;Y. Y s ' j 1) 
E(Y II + Yl2 + ... + Y 10) 
14(}l+a l ) 
14 III 
E(Y21 + Y22 + ... + Y2D ) 
14(}l+az) 
14112 
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14 (}l + a3) 
14 113 
E(Y41 + Y42 + ... + Y4D ) 
14 (}l + a4) 
14 114 










2:; Y4· . J 
A == _J __ 
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were chosen as the five indices of water quality for 
five different water uses. These are the simple 
arithmetic mean, derived from calculated observa-
tions. The empirical model used only Y1 . and Yz . as 
variables. 
Data Collection 
Data were collected for all SMSA's from several 
sources. The data for the income distributions and 
the variables in the empirical model, exluding water 
quality parameters, were obtained from the 1960 and 
1970 Census of Population (U.S. Bureau of the 
Census, 1963, 1973, 1974, 1975) and the 1970 City 
and County Data Book (Inter-University Consortium, 
1972). Some data were not compatible between 
years, so that original data tapes were obtained from 
the Bureau of the Census and the data were reorgan-
ized in order that compatibility was achieved. For 
example, income distribution groupings were dif-
ferent from 1960 to 1970, and it was necessary to 
utilize the more precise groupings from 1960 data 
from the data tapes in order to construct a 13-group 
distribution for 1960 comparable to the 1970 data. 
The SMSA's were then grouped in order to compare 
1960 and 1970 classification. One hundred seventy-
two SMSA's were listed in both years with little or no 
change in spatial designations from 1960 to 1970. 
SMSA's were eliminated when either the SMSA's were 
created between 1960 and 1970, or 1960 SMSA's had 
been enlarged or combined in the 1970 data. 
Data for water quality controls were collected 
from the regional offices of the Environmental 
Protection Agency.4 Compilations of each state's 
quality requirements were available from most re-
gions. The Central Region data were collected from 
each state's legal documents concerning water quality 
parameters. A final aggregation of water quality 
standards by state and use type was made and where 
only qualitative parameters existed for standards 
(criteria or classification) adjustments were made to 
reflect average or similar quantitative parameters for 
other states. 
The enforcement of these water quality 
standards was not fully implemented by 1970. Not 
until 1972 and 1973 did water quality controls 
actually become widely applied. However, it is 
4References for each state are listed in the references 
section, but are too numerous for individual citation in the 
text. 
assumed that industries and other producers reacted 
to these controls as if enforcement was extant in all 
cases. The expectation of enforcement was likely 
incorporated into industrial management plans, since 
the passage of PL 92-500 and its amendments were 
indicative of future requirements. As long as busi-
nesses acted as if these controls were a fact, the 
impact is identical. Not until the 1980 Census will a 
full test of the impact be possible, since annual data 
for income distribution for SMSA's is not available. 
Initial Results 
The initial results of the empirical test were 
taken from two stage least squares regression using 
the 172 SMSA's as the sample. Results were: 
1) DP 0.4757 DW - 0.1019 W 2.0951 P 
(0.554) (0.477) (0.517) 
- 0.0428 WI 0.0627 WA - 0.8274 DB 
(0.218) (0.325) (0.4 79) 
2) DW = 2.4462 DP + 0.2014 W + 4.6878 P 
(0.660) (2.436) (1. 759) 
+ 0.2141 WI + 1.6880 DB 
(0.985) (1.460) 
3) DG = 0.6436 + 28.8540 DP - 0.5973 DW 
(0.375) (1.119) (1.271) 
+ 4.8329 DH 
(0.890) 
4) DH 0.1822 5.2485 DP + 0.1051 DW 
(0.875) (2.254 ) (2.393) 
+0.1182DG 
(0.781) 
Numbers in parenthesis are the absolute values 
of the t-statistic. A statistical problem exists with 
regard to the interpretation of the t-statistic. Since 
the small sample properties of simultaneous equation 
systems are not known, except for the most simple 
cases (two equations, two or three unknowns), the 
large-sample asymptotic distribution is also not 
known for models of this size. It must be assumed 
that these distributions asymptotically approach a 
t-distribution. However, the distributions which have 
been generated for the simple cases are not 
distributed as a t. Thus, the significance of the 
t-statistics is in doubt. The common practice in the 
literature is to treat the results as if a Student's twas 
appropriate, which is the approach used in this 
report. 
Two empirical problems were also evident in 
the initial regressions. First, the correlation between 
the two water quality parameters was very high 
(approximately 0.77). Thus, the DP equation was 
multicolinear. In response, the WA variable was 
dropped from Equation 1 and WI was used as a proxy 
variable for both quality parameters. A few sig-
nificant differences in coefficients and significance 
levels are observed. Results were: 
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DP = 0.1323 DW - 0.0181 W - 0.7814 P + 0.0219 WI 
(1.260) (0.641) (1.011) (0.494) 
- 0.3699 DB 
(0.989) 
The DW, DC, and DH equations did not differ 
significantly from the initial results. 
The second empirical problem was perhaps 
more critical. It is clear that the 1960-1970 decade 
was one in which broad public programs and defense 
expenditures increased enormously, and public policy 
changed in many ways which might have affected 
changes in income distribution more than water 
quality controls. These policies would include tax 
exchange and public expenditure shifts. In order to 
eliminate as many of these compounding factors as 
pOSSible, the SMSA's were grouped, using factor 
analysis, into more or less homogenous factors. A 
Q-type analysis was required to group the SMSA's. 
This analysis uses a transposed matrix, so that the 
SMSA's become the factors which are grouped while 
the demographic variables, normally grouped in a 
factor analysis, become the independent observations 
or cases. Because the SMSA's exhibited a wide 
variation in the demographic characteristics, 
standardization for several of the demographic' 
characteristics were required. Standardization was 
performed prior to transposing the matrix. 
The number of demographic variables, or cases, 
on which the Q analysis was performed exceeded the 
n1jmber of SMSA's in both 1960 and 1970. One 
hundred and twenty-nine characteristics were 
identified as relevant to the factoring of SMSA's. In 
order to perform the statistical procedures, the 
number of cases must exceed the number of factors, 
similar to the conditions required for a solution to 
multiple equation systems. It was necessary, there-
fore, to divide the SMSA's into smaller groups. This 
was done on the basis of population. For 1960, a 
division was made between SMSA's over and under 
250,000 population. For 1970, four divisions were 
made based on population: under 150,000; 150,001 
to 250,000, 250,001 to 500,000, and over 500,000. 
Data for all the characteristics were taken from the 
Census of Populations for each year and from the 
City and County Data Book. 
The groupings were picked from the Rotated 
Factor Matrix factors with an element greater than 
the absolute value of 0.50 with relatively low loadings 
on other factors. If an SMSA seemed to load on more 
than one factor it was eliminated from the analysis. 
The rotation was based on the verimax criterion, was 
orthogonal, and used the correlation matrix. The 
trace of that matrix was the squared multiple 
correlation coefficients. A listing of the results of the 
factor analysis for 1960 and 1970 may be found in 
Appendix 3. Two non-orthogonal rotations were also 
attempted, and results were not different from the 
art hogonal approach. 
SMSA's which remained in the same factor for 
both 1960 and 1970 were compiled. The results were 
not usable, because no more than seven to ten such 
SMSA's could be found in anyone factor. Since the 
number of variables in the regression equations 
exceeded the number of observations or allowed only 
one or two degrees of freedom, a further consolida-
tion of SMSi\'s was required. The consolidation was 
pcrrormed by eliminating some of the popUlation 
breakdown for 1970, and combining the factors. The 
popUlation groupings for both 1960 and 1970 were 
two: over 2~0,000 and under 250,000. Factor 
analysis in these two categories yielded two groups 
wi! II 20 and 16 observations (SMSA's). Table 3 is a 
list of these SMSi\'s by population group. 
Regressions were run on these groups for both 
the included and excluded Wi\. in Equation I. Results 
of I hese regressions arc: 
I) DP 0.1404 DW - 0.0243 W 
(1277) (0.751) 
+ 1.1113 WI - 1.0903 WA 
( 1.078) (1.047) 
2) DW 7.0120 DP + 0.1443 \V 
(1.173) (1.160) 
0.1439 WI + 3.0209 DB 
(0365) (1.992) 




4) DH -0.6054 + 0.2877 DP 
(2.893) (0.087) 
- 0.3056 DG 
(0.818) 
Group 2 
1) DP 0.0543 DW - 0.0103 W 
(0.793) (0.344) 
+ 0.0952 WI 0.0382 WA 
(1.129) (0.560) 
2) DW = 19.0096 DP + 0.1212 W 
3} 
(0.819) (0.366) 














- 0.1546 DW 
(1.168) 
- 0.3275 DW 
(0.035) 
+ 0.0119 P 
(0.029) 






4) DH :-0.4129 - 1.8463 DP + 0.0249 DW 
(6.809) (2.066) (0.753) 
- 0.0202 DG 
(0.231) 
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When WA was excluded, the sign of WI remained the 
same, but the coefficient value and significance levels 
fell. 
The interpretation of the results is somewhat 
unclear, even though some results do appear con-
sistent among all regressions. Some of the conceptuaJ 
model's implications appear to be corroborated. The 
proxies for the strength of bargaining power ~ as 
represented by the proportion of wages to total 
output (DB) are significant in determining the change 
in wages across SMSA's, at least at the 15 percent 
level, in almost every regression. The interrelation 
between the two parameters of the beta function is 
not clearly indicated. The price equation appears to 
indicate that none of the variables from the model are 
very significant in determining price changes, aJ· 
though the industrial water controls appear most 
significant (at about the 20 percent level) for the 
grouped data regressions. 
As Thurow (1972) points out, increase in the 
first parameter of the beta distribution (a or DG in 
this study) leads to a more dispersed, or more equal, 
distribution. Increases in the second parameter (p or 
DH) leads to a less equal distribution, ceterus 
paribus. 5 Since change in price has a positive co-
efficient in the DG equation and negative in the DH, 
where coefficients are significant at more than the 
0.15 level, increases in price appear to make income 
distribution more equal. The result is certainly 
counter-intuitive, although it agrees with Thurow's 
overall conclusions. The negative sign for price 
changes in the DH (P) equation agrees with Thurow's 
results, while the positive sign in the DG (a) equation 
differs from his results. 
The effect of industrial wages is exactly the 
opposite. Increases in wages result in decreases in DG 
(a) and increases in DH (p) which indicates that the 
industrial wage increases lead to a less equal income 
distribution. Thurow did not include wages as a 
variable in his equations, so no comparison is pos-
sible. 
The effects of the water quality parameters 
were also not clear cut. Coefficients for agricultural 
can trois, where significant at the 0.20 level, were 
negative for the price estimation equation. which 
implies that these controls would affect a less equal 
distIibution of income through the DP parameter. 
The industrial water quality controls, where sig-
nificant in the price equation, had a positive sign 
indicating a more equal income distribution. Since 
the quality variable was consistently not significant in 
the wage equations, the industrial controls apparently 
have no effect on income distribution through wages. 
Moreover, the sign of the parameter is not consistent 
between equations. 
Results from the Alternative Model 
The results from the reformulation of the initial 
empirical are listed below. For 172 observations: 
1) DP = -0.0141 WI -0.0001 WA+0.0656 DW _3XIO- 12 DY 
(0.560) (0.003) (7.193) (1.850) 
2) DW=0.0232 DE+15.8358 DP+0.0842 DB+0.2160WI 
(0.554) (7.300) (0.071) (0.961) 
3) DG=1.9296 + 18.7972 DP - 0.4135 DW+ 5.7254 DH 
(1.349) (1.047) (1.471) (1.417) 
4) DH =- 0.3250 - 3.3328 DP + 0.0684 DW + 0.1473 DG 
(1.892) (1.852) (1.809) (1.337) 
A second regression, eliminating W A was run. 
Results were not Significantly different from the 
above equation. 
5This is true only if the estimated Lorenz curve falls 
below. the 45 degree equal distribution line. If the curve lies 
above that line the opposite is true. The estimations for the 
beta parameters for the data indicate that the Lorenz curve is, 
in all cases, below the 45° line. 
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For Group 1 
1) DP = 0.4315 WI -0.4487 WA +0.0654- 4X10- 12 DY 
(1.224) (1.232) (3.053) (1.111) 
2) DW=-O.Ol97DE+ 18.6438 DP + 1. 7907 DB - 0.046 WI 
(0.190) (4.122) (0.873) (0.091) 
3) DG = 0.2612 + 4.5581 DP - 0.1541 DW + 0.8679 DH 
(0.529) (1.169) (1.250) (1.120) 
4) DH=-0.5217 - 0.8658 DP+0.0283 DW+0.2136 DG 
(4.025) (0.367) (0.374) (LOll) 
For Group 2 
1) DP = 0.0855 WI -0.0303 WA +0.0352 DW-2X1011 DY 
(1.713) (0.747) (1.447) (0.403) 
2) DW=-0.1815 DE+ 19.7151 DP+ 1.3600 DB - 0.3982 WI 
(1.735) (1.842) (0.727) (0.298) 
3) DG= 1.5172 + 2.1454 DP+0.1334DW+ 3.5823 DH 
(0.819) (0.430) (0.542) (0.826) 
4) DH=-0.4186-0.7239 DP - 0.0356 DW +0.0674 DG 
(4.867) (0.897) (0.854) (0.526) 
These results are similar to those of the initial 
modeJ, although change in total income, as a proxy 
for output, appears significant in the determination 
of price change and changes in wages and prices are 
very significantly intercorrelated. Increase in income 
has a negative coefficient for price, which indicates a 
less equal redistribution of wealth. This is, again, a 
counter-intuitive result. 
Ordinary least squares regressions were run for 
the two beta distribution parameters. Results were: 
DG 0.0770 - 2.2069 P- 0.0592 WI + 0.0111 W 
(2.040) (9.501) (3.479) (1.730) 
+ 0.4425 DB + 1.4276 DP+O.0013 DW 
(4.572) (5.647) (0.203) 
DH '" -0.4554 +0.5903 P -0.0194 WI + 0.0071 W 
(27.371) (5.770) (2.587) (2.515) 
+ 0.1820 DB-1.7619 DP+O.OOOI DW 
(4.269) (15.821) (0.004) 
The change in price variable is highly significant, and 
the signs are the same as in the multiple equation 
model. The factor payment and water quality 
parameters are also significant, but have the same sign 
in both regressions. The overall effect of water 
quality control would be to decrease DG ((J ) relative 
to DH (p), so that distribution would become more 
unequal. This result is different from the multi-
equation estimation. Clearly, a multi-equation 
approach is warranted, due to the simultaneity of 
determination of the variables. 
Given the reservations concerning both the em-
pirical model's structure and the interpretation of the 
empirical results, policy prescriptions appear rather 
inappropriate. Clearly, there have been changes in the 
income distribution in SMSA's from 1960 to 1970, as 
indicated by the changes in the beta distribution func-
Hons' parameters. Without a more correctly specified 
model and extensive data collection, the causality of 
these changes is not clear, even though water quality 
controls are significant variables in the regressions. 
Summary and Conclusions 
There were two main objectives of this research. 
The first was to test the various distribution functions 
in order to determine which was most appropriate for 
estimating income distribution changes. The second 
was to examine the impacts of water quality controls 
on income distribution using an empirical model 
relating the parameters of the chosen distribution 
function to variables which were expected to in-
fluence income distribution, including water quality 
controls. The beta distribution function was clearly 
the best estimator of distribution, based on the 
Gastwirth bounds as a test of goodness of fit. The 
parameters of the beta function were estimated using 
a conceptional model developed from an approach 
used by Pitchford and Turnovsky. Data were col-
lected from the Bureau of the Census for 1960 and 
1970, the City and County Data Book for 1912, and 
the Environmental Protection Agency. 
Results of the water quality analYSis were 
mixed and somewhat difficult to interpret. It 
appeared that water quality parameters may effect 
the price index, if these parameters were not sur-
rogates for other excluded variables in the economic 
system. Bargaining power variables appeared to be the 
most significan t in the wage change equation while 
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total income had a negative effect on prices. Both 
price and wage changes were significant in many of 
the parameter equations but results were quite 
counter-intuitive. Some of these results did agree with 
those obtained by Thurow. 
In order to reduce the probability that water 
quality con troIs were proxies for other variables, 
factor analysis was performed on the SMSA's and two 
groups of similar SMSA's were identified. The results 
of these regressions conformed rather closely, both in 
sign and significance levels, to the overall model. 
Additional regressions used to eliminate multi-
colinearity of the water quality controls were run 
with no Significant changes in results. A test consist-
ing of a single equation linear regression of the 
variables on the distribution parameters for all the 
SMSA's yielded somewhat different conclusions with 
respect to the effect of controls, but these results are 
suspect since the regression ignored the simultaneity 
of the determination of the variable values. 
Conclusions with respect to distribution 
changes were difficult to draw because of the data 
problems. It appears that water quality controls may 
affect price changes, which in turn may cause a shif~ 
in income in the direction of less equal distribution 
for agricultural controls and more equal for industrial 
controls. However, better data are required for more 
complete and accurate analysis. The model should be 
broadly expanded to include other policy parameters, 
in order to draw more positive conclusions about 
specific impacts of water quality policy. 
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1960 and 1970 Factor Analysis for SMSA's 
1960 SMSA's Over 250,000 
Factor 1 (21) Factor 3 (11) Factor 9 (7) 
Atlanta, Ga. Charleston, W.v. Dallas, Tex. 
Beaumont, Tex. Denver, Colo. Resno, Calif. 
Birmingham, Ala. El Paso, Tex. Houston, Tex. 
Buffalo, N.Y. Flint, Mich. Kansas City, Mo. 
Charlotte, N.C. Huntington, W.V. Oklahoma City, Ok. 
Chattanooga, Tenn. Johnstown, Pa. Tulsa, Ok. 
Cleveland, Ohio Sacramento, Calif. Wichita, Kan. 
Columbia, S.C. San Jose, Calif. Factor 10 (4) 
Pa. Utica, N.Y. 
Jacksonville, Florida Washington, D.C. Jersey City, N.J. 
Findervill, Tenn. Wilkes-Barre, Pa. Newark, N.J . 
Memphis, Tenn. Factor 5 (6) Paterson, N.J. 
Milwaukee, Wisc. Trenton, N.J. 
Mobile, Ala. Bridgeport, Conn. Factor 11 (4) 
Nashville, Tenn. Hartford, Conn. 
Newark, N.J. New Haven, Conn. Bakersfield, Calif. 
Norfolk, Va. Providence, R.I. Columbus, Ohio 
Patterson, N.1. Springfield, Mass. Gary, Ind. 
Rochester, N.Y. Worcester, Mass. Indianapolis, Ind. 
San Antonio, Tex. Factor 6 (5) 
Shreveport, La. Baltimore, Md. Factor 12 (2) 
Factor 2 (20) Portland, Oreg. Cincinnati, Ohio 
Akron, Ohio Seattle, Wash. Louisville, Ky. 
Canton, Ohio Spokane, Wash. No Cities 
Chicago, Ill. Tacoma, Wash. 
Davenport, Iowa Factor 7 (8) Factor 4,13,14 
Dayton, Ohio Ft. Worth, Tex. Cities Not Grouped (7) Ft. Lauderdale, Fla. Miami, Fla. Albany, N.Y. Grand Rapids, Mich. Orlando, Fla. Boston, Mass. Greensboro, N.C. Phoenix, Ariz. Des Moines, Iowa Lansing, Mich. San Bernandino, Calif. Detroit, Mich. Las Angeles, Calif. San Diego, Calif. Honolulu, Hawaii Miami, Fla. Tampa, Fla. New Orleans, La. New York, N.Y. 
Peoria, Ill. Tucson, Ariz. 
Omaha, Nebraska 
New York, N.Y. Factor 8 (6) 
Salt Lake City, Ut. Albuquerque, N.M. San Francisco, Calif. 
Syracuse, N.Y. Allentown, Pa. Erie, Pa. Toledo, Ohio Harrisburg, Pa. Wilmington, Del. Lancaster, Pa. Youngstown, Ohio Reading, Pa. 
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1960 SMSA's Under 250,000 
Factor 1 (22) 
Austin, Tex. 





















Factor 2 (17) 
Albany, Ga. 












Sioux Falls, S.D. 
Wheeling, W.V. 
York"Pa. 
Factor 3 (14) 
Altoona, Pa. 
Cedar Rapids, Iowa 
Ft. Smith, Ark. 






San Angelo, Tex. 




Factor 4 (12) 
Brokton, Mass. 






New Bedford, Mass. 




Factor 5 (4) 
St. Joseph, Mo. 
Sioux City, Iowa 
Springfield, Mo. 
Terre Haute, Ind. 





Factor 7 (2) 
Lincoln, Nebr. 
Topeka, Kan. 
Factor 8 (2) 
Macon, Ga. 
Newport-News, Va. 
Factor 9 (3) 
Colorado Springs, Colo. 
Las Vegas, Nev. 
Reno, Nev. 
Factor 10 (2) 
Brownsville, Tex. 
Stanford, Conn. 
Factor 11 (2) 
Ann Arbor, Mich. 
Champaign, Ill. 
Factor 12 (2) 
Santa Barbara, Calif. 
West Palm Beach, Fla. 
Factor 13 (1) 
Galveston, Tex. 
Factor 14 (1) 
Amarillo, Tex. 
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Factor 15 (3) 
Abilene, Tex. 
Amarillo, Tex. 
Wichita Falls, Tex. 
No Cities Factors 16& 12 
Cities Not Grouped 
Ashville, N.C. 
Augusta, Ga. 
Baton Rouge, La. 
Columbus, Ga. 
Corpus Christi, Tex. 
Eugene, Ore. 
Green Bay, Wisc. 
Kalamazoo, Mich. 












SMSA's 1970 Between 150,000&250,000 (50) 
Factor 1 (8) 
Beoran, Mass. 





Terre Haute, Ind. 
Waterbury, Conn. 
Factor 2 (6) 
Atlantic City, N.J. 
Huntsville, Ala. 

















Factor 5 (3) 
Modesto, Calif. 
Santa Rosa, Calif. 
Vallego, Calif. 
Factor 6 (7) 







Factor 7 (1) 
Evansville, Ind. 
Factor 8 (3) 
Colorado Springs, Colo. 
Fayetteville, N.C. 
Stamford, Conn. 
Factor 9 (1) 
Roanoke, Va. 
Factor 10 (3) 
Ann Arbor, Mich. 
Champaign, Ill. 
Durham, N.C. 
Factor 11 (1) 
Galveston, Tex. 
Factor 12 (1) 





New London, Conn. 
Pensacola, Fla. 
SMSA's 1970 Under 150,000 
Factor 1 (12) 
Anderson, Ind. 








New Britian, Conn. 
San Angelo, Tex. 
Vineland, N.J. 







Factor 3 (3) 
Dubque, Iowa 
La Crosse, Wisc. 
Sioux Falls, S.D. 







Factor 5 (7) 
Fitchburg, Mass. 
Layfayette, La. 





Factor 6 (6) 






Factor 7 (3) 
St. Joseph, Mo. 
Sioux City, Iowa 
Waco, Tex. 
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Factor 8 (5) 
Gadsen, Ala. 
Owensburo, Ky. 
Pine Bluff, Ark. 
Texakana, Tex. 
Tyler, Tex. 




Factor 10 (3) 
Waterloo, Iowa 
Wichita Falls, Tex. 
Wilmington, N.C. 
Factor 11 (1) 
Amarillo, Tex. 
Factor 12 (5) 
Billings, Mon t. 
Boise,Id. 
Pargo, N.D. 
Great Falls, Mont. 
Rochester, N.Y. 
Factor 13 (2) 
Lynchburg, Va. 
Petersburg, Va. 









SMSA's 1970 Over 500,000 

















Factor 2 (7) 






















SMSA's 1970 Over 500,000 













Factor 6 (2) 
Portland, Ore. 
Seattle 
Factor 7 (2) 
Baltimore 
Richmond 




Salt Lake City 










Factor 11 (1) 
Milwaukee 
Factor 12 (0) 
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SMSA's 1970 Between 250,000&500,000 (60) 
Factor 1 (20) 
Augusta, Ga. 





Corpus Christi, Tex. 
Daven Port, Iowa 
El Paso, Tex. 
Jackson, Miss. 
Knoxville, Tenn. 
Uttle Rock, Ark. 
Mobile, Ala. 




South Bend, Ind. 
Tren ton, N.J . 
Worcester, Mass. 























West Palm Beach, Fla. 









Factor 6 (2) 
Des Moines, Iowa 
Flint, Mich. 
Factor 7 (2) 
Spokane, Wash. 
Tacoma, Wash. 
Factor 8 (0) 
Factor 9 (0) 
Factors 10-13 (0) 




Fort Wayne, Ind. 
lansing, Mich. 
New Port News, Va. 
Wilmington, Del. 
Factors 8-13 (0) 
